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for Personal Protective 
Equipment 
Introduction 
I nternational Standards for Mine Action are be ing revised by the United Nations. As part of the revision process, a working group on personal 
protective equipment (WGPPE) has been established 
to examine the subject of safe ty in mine clearance op-
erations, and to make recommendations on standards 
and guidelines for PPE. T his paper is based on the 
WGPPE's report. 
The concepts of safety, risk and risk management 
are not new to humanitarian mine clearance. Risk 
management involves the identification, analysis , as-
sessment and removal (or at least reduction) of risk. 
The term implies dominance and comrol of the risk, 
and the application of agreed processes to achieve 
consistent results. 
It is necessary to clarify the meaning of the term 
safe in respect to mine clearance. To say that a situa-
tion is safe implies a final judgement that the risk is 
in some sense acceptable or tolerable, or even non-
existent. However, the terms "acceptable" and "tol-
erable" imply human judgement of the situation and 
judgement may be tentative, transient and fallible. 
A Systems Approach to the Problem 
A recent international study of mine accidents 
and incidents carried our by Andy Smith on behalf 
of the U.S. Department of Defense (DoD) has re-
vealed that in the vast majority of cases, victims ei-
ther fai led to wear PPE correctly or were engaged in 
activities which contravened local Standing Operat-
ing Procedures (SOPs) . A simple statement of the blast 
and ballistic protection levels alone would be inad-
equate for international safety standards. A systems 
approach considering rhe threat, training, operating 
procedures, supervision, equipment capabilities, en-
vironmental factors and protection levels is needed to 
enable managers of mine clearance operations to de-
cide appropriate local requirements for PPE. 
Mine and UXO Threat 
Though the term "thr eat" is not often found in 
general safety literature, it is frequently used in mine 
clearance to describe the extent of risk at a particular 
time in a particular country, province or district. T hreat 
is a useful concept and we must establish a common 
understanding of its meaning and application. 
Whereas "risk" refers to the probability and se-
verity of a single occurrence of harm, the threat from 
mines and UXO refers to the sum of local risks in an 
area or theatre. In mine clearance, the probability of 
harm is a combination of the quantity of munitions 
with the potential to cause harm and rhe probability 
of fai ling to detect a single active mine/UXO. T here 
seem to be three components of any threat within a 
given area: (1) The type of hazard (fragmentation, blast 
or incendiary), and rhe severity of physical harm which 
would result from irs unintended detonation; (2) The 
detecrability of mines and/or UXO; and (3) The quan-
tity of mines and/or UXO within a given area. 
-------------------------------------------
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Threat is dependent on rime as well as area. In 
some mine-affected theaters it will reduce over time 
from demining and through effective mine awareness 
training. In other theaters it may increase over rime 
from uncontrolled vegetation coverage, so il move-
ments and the cumulative effects of weather. 
The threat can be demonstrated graphically as 
shown in Table 1 below. T his example, which uses 
data from Bosnia-Herzegovina, attempts to illustrate 
the antipersonnel (AP) mine threat in Sector 
MND(SW). In general, mines towards the top right 
of the table represent a greater threat than those to-
wards the bottom left. The size of rhe circle is pro-
portional to the quantity of mines. 
Risk Management 
In recent years, the concepts of risk, risk man-
agement and safety h ave received much attention 
from industry and academia. This attention can be 
explained in part by a moral imperative and by a 
growing sense of duty, bur it is mainly driven by the 
impact ofl irigation. The International Organisation 
fo r Standardisation (ISO) has had to address these 
issues in the workplace. ISO guidel ines for the de-
velopment of safety standards are relevant, and the 
ISO approach has proved to be an appropriate model 
to guide the work of the WGPPE. 
Notwithstanding the legal imperatives to reduce 
risk, humanitarian mine clearance imposes a moral 
duty of care that demands attention be given to the 
consequence of all actions, and also to the conse-
quence of inaction. The latter is often overlooked, 
and is particularly relevant to those in positions of 
authority, supervision or of professional standing in 
humanitarian mine clearance. 
Health and Safety 
The International Labour Organisation (lLO) 
is a specialist agency of the United Nations, which 
seeks the promotion of human and labor rights. The 
ILO formulates international standards in the form 
of Conventions and Recommendations by seuing 
minimum norms, including basic standards regulat-
ing conditions of work and the workplace. In 1981, 
the ILO adopted a Convention (C l 55) and related 
Recommendation (R164) on Occupational Safety 
and Health. 
Precedent and norms already exist at interna-
tional level to provide guidance for the developmenr 
of new inrernational standards for safety in mine 
clearance. T he concept of responsibi lity included in 
ISO and ILO documents implies the need for ac-
countabili ty. In particular, rhe responsibilities and ob-
ligations of the national authorities, mine action cen-
ters, the employers and employees, as required by the 
ILO, should be applied to the management of mine 
clearance and be included in the revised safety stan-
dards. 
Mine Incidents and Accidents 
Risk reduction involves a combination of safe 
operating procedures, education, training, effective 
supervision and PPE. In adopting a systems approach, 
the WGPPE considered it necessary to analyze and 
evaluate the relationships berween these factors be-
fore deciding whether 
the residual risk to 
deminers is "tolerable." 
This conforms to the 
approach taken by ISO 
in d eveloping safety 
standards. 
Much of the 
WGPPE's analysis and 
many of its conclusions 




AP mine threat, 
MND(SW) Bosnia-
Herzegovina Table 1 
PROM-1 
(8'~'o) 
rived from the Data-
base of Demining Inci-
dent Victims (D D IV) 
compiled by Sm ith . 
The database covers 
Least SEVERITY OF HAR .. Greatest 
mine clearance inci-
dents in Angola, Afghanistan, Cam-
bodia, Bosnia-Herzegovina, Mozambique and Zim-
babwe. 
T he DDIV is a record of explosive incidents in-
volving deminers. The victims were employed by 
NGOs, commercial demining companies, national 
agencies and, in some cases, the military. T he current 
release (Version 1) of the database contains the records 
of 319 victims and 249 incidents. 
Mine and UXO Hazards 
AP blast mi nes are the most abundant mines 
encountered in h umanitarian mine clearance and 
cause the greatest number of injuries. At close quar-
ters, AP fragmentatio n mines overmatch the PPE cur-
rently available. Due to the area effect of such mines, 
they also have the potential to effect secondary vic-
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Areas of the Body at 
Risk Table 2 
Severe Minor 
Head and neck: 94 148 
Upper Limb: 92 142 
Lower Limb: 109 98 
Trunk: 40 77 
to detonate and are less hazardous to manual deminers 
unless employed in a non-conventional manner. Ef-
fective PPE against AT mines is nor available. 
In general, when UXO munitions are encoun-
tered in mine clearance operations, they have already 
malfunctioned, rho ugh some are specifically designed 
as area denial weapons. They are usually high in metal 
content, on or near the surface. Since most are easily 
detectable, they constitute less of a hazard than mines. 
When rhe threat from "advanced UXO" exists, spe-
cialist EOD teams should be used. The varied nature 
ofUXO means that the hazard is best dealt with pro-
cedurally, rather than relying on PPE designed pri-
marily for humanitarian mine clearance. 
The effect of blast is roughly proportional to the 
explosive content, though it can vary according to 
the mine's construction. The PMN (240g) is an ap-
propriate level to protect against, as it is one of the 
most common mines found in reported incidents. 
Most mines with larger charges (PROM-1, V69) are 
fragmentation mines, and rhe lerhaliry of their frag-
mentation effects is more significant than blast. 
Fragment sizes and velocities vary greatly, even 
from mines of the same type with grooved/notched 
casing. DDIV analysis shows a high percentage of 
fatalities from fragmentation mines (52 percent of 
bounding fragmentation mine incidents and 22 per-
cent offragmentarion mine incidents); survivors were 
usually secondary victims. Currem PPE levels do nor 
protect against close proximity fragmentation mines 
bur may protect secondary victims. 
There is also a fragmentation hazard from rhe 
casing and inner components of some AP blast mines. 
Furthermore, AP blast mines buried in scree, gravel 
roads and tracks and in soil comaining a high percent-
age of stones represent a particular challenge for PPE. 
Harmful Activities 
The most common mine clearance activities which 
led to harm were excavation (36 percent) and missed-






ging with any tool or investigating a pre-
viously located mine; a missed-mine inci-
dent occurs when a victim initiates a de-
vice which the deminer or any other mem-
ber of the demining unit has failed to lo-
cate. While excavating, almost all 
deminers were injured in rhe squatting or 
kneeling position. 
Less than 10 percent of incidents in-
volved deminers (mis)handling or hold-,_, _____________________ _ 
---
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ing the mine during examination or disarming. Nearly 
seven percem of incidents involved behavior consid-
ered dangerous or careless, such as stepping ourside a 
cleared and well-marked area. 
Only two percent of all incidents involved an 
accident during detection. It should be noted, how-
ever, rhar this low figure may disguise the practice of 
"detection by excavation," which is sometimes applied. 
Areas of the Body at Risk 
The DDIV classifies non-fatal injuries as severe 
if rhey were likely to be life threatening, to require 
surgery or to result in permanent disability. All other 
injuries are classified as minor. The distinction is not 
intended to reflect rhe suffering and/or hardship as-
sociated with any injury. The areas of the body at risk 
are summarized in Table 2 below. 
The risk of severe injuries to the head and to the 
limbs (both upper and lower) is similar, but the risk 
to rhe trunk is not as severe. The majority of head and 
upper limb injuries were caused while excavating and 
from (mis)handling incidents, whereas rhe majority 
oflower limb injuries were caused by missed-mine in-
cidents. 
(Note: The lower number of injuries to rhe trunk 
cannot be explained by rhe provision ofPPE since rhe 
DDIV suggests that in rhe majority of cases the vic-
tims were not wearing any body protection). 
Environment 
The diversity of environmental factors make it 
difficult to generalize about their impact on safety as 
a whole and on PPE in particular. Cl imatic extremes 
are a constant concern in some theaters through high 
temperamre, humidity or cold. In addition, there may 
be local environmental problems which demand use 
of specialized PPE or life support equipment. 
Analysis and Discussion 
Perception(s): It is often assumed rhar minimum 
metal mines represent the greatest risk to deminers, 
as they are, at least in theory, the most difficult to 
detect. However, this assumption is not confirmed by 
the number of reported injuries. The majority of 
missed mine incidents involve a PMN, PMN 2 or 
PPM-2 and all have significant metal content. There 
may be a psychological "risk adjustment, " which 
causes deminers to operate with greater caution in 
areas where minimal metal mines are expected. 
Fatalities: Incidents resulting in death show a 
disproportionate number resulting from bounding 
-- -- - ----
fragmentation mines. AP blast mines account for the 
next greatest number followed by larger mines. Veg-
etation clearance produced the highest number of 
deminer fatalities. Handling or manipulating mines 
(some during rhe process of disarming) proved to be 
the second highest readily identifiable activity at the 
rime of death. 
Injuries: Evidence suggests that AP blast mines 
were the most common cause of de miner injury (62 
percent) , of which the PMN and PMN-2 series 
caused 38 percent of the incidents. 
Protection: A fragmentation jacket or apron of 
some kind was issued to under a third of the victims 
recorded in the DDIV. Ir was worn in only half of 
those cases, and visors were temporarily discarded or 
raised by 56 percent of the victims issued with them. 
The thickest visors commonly worn were 5mm thick. 
T hese appeared to provide adequate protection 
against blast and were considered wearable by 
deminers. There was also evidence of severe hand 
injuries resulting (at least in part) from the use of 
inappropr.iare hand-tools during manual demining. 
Risk Reduction 
Risk Management: Risk reduction involves a 
combination offactors, including safe operating pro-
cedures, education, training, PPE and effective su-
pervision. Though international guidelines and na-
tional SOPs can provide advice on how this can be 
achieved, the responsibility for risk management lies 
principally with the employers be they national 
reams, demining NGOs or commercial contractors. 
This responsibility must be embedded in the man-
agement culture and practices of all organizations 
involved in the planning and prosecution of humani-
tarian mine clearance operations. 
Control and supervision: There is much room 
fo r improvement in the control and supervision of 
humanitarian mine clearance operations. Over 50 
percent of the injuries recorded in the DDIV were 
apparently caused by inadequate "field control." Im-
proved field discipline and control through educa-
tion, training and supervision would reduce rhe risk 
to deminers. It would also increase the overall effi -
ciency of clearance operations. An accident causes 
substantial dislocation and delay in addition to the 
obvious injuries to the victim and to the socio-eco-
nomic impact on his family and community. 
Reports and Investigations: T here is significant 
variation in the quality and timeliness of reports and 
post-incident investigations. Consideration should be 
given ro the development of an international standard 
for reponing and for the conduct of investigations and 
inquiries. Though local requiremenrs may vary, there 
is a need to maintain objectivity and impartiality and 
to facilitate lessons learned about risk and safety issues. 
PPE Requirements 
Human Factors: The frequency with which 
deminers fail to wear PPE suggests that equipment 
and clothing is either inappropriate or is already at 
or beyond the "wearable" limits of weight and mo-
bility, though some improvements could be achieved 
through better field discipline. Any assessment of PPE 
requirements must recognize the limits of acceptabil-
ity by addressing the human factors, including envi-
ronmental conditions and ergonomics. 
Associated Equipment: The systems approach to 
risk reduction includes an understanding of the in-
terface between rhe deminer and his/her associated 
equipment. In this respect, rhe selection and use of 
hand-protection and appropriate hand-tools is par-
ticularly important and should be considered as an 
integral parr of the PPE requirement. 
Blast: The explosive content of a PMN is" . .. just 
under rhe threshold for overpressure injuries ." Larger 
explosive content is generally confined to fragmenra-
rion mines where the lerhali ty of fragmentation is more 
significant than blast. The DDIV provides no evidence 
to suggest the need to protect against overpressure 
from AP blast mines, yet tests conducted by Canadian 
Defence Research Establishment Suffield (DRES) sug-
gest rhe possibility in certain cases of" ... severe, criti-
cal or unsurvivable injury." 
Fragmentation: Current accepted levels of PPE 
provide inadequate protection against fragmentation 
mines at close quarters, and procedures/processes 
must be appl ied (with conviction) to reduce rhe risk 
to a tolerable level. PPE should continue to be de-
signed to protect "secondary victims" against fragmen-
tation mines. 
Boots: Blast-resistant boots which are designed 
with at least a 1 Ocm stand-off may reduce injuries 
when stepping on small blast mines, but they impair 
mobility and are unlikely to be accepted for general 
use though they may have some specialist application. 
There is no clear evidence to suggest that blast-resis-
tant mine boots, without any stand-off, would reduce 
injury to an acceptable level. Indeed, some evid ence 
suggests chat such boots may acrually worsen the se-
verity of leg and groin injuries when stepping on a 
PMN. Further evidence from study and independent continued on page 77 
------------------
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